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Abstract. We develop a new notion of security against timing attacks where the attacker
is able to simultaneously observe the execution time of a program and the probability of
the values of low variables. We then show how to measure the security of a program with
respect to this notion via a computable estimate of the timing leakage and use this estimate
for cost optimisation.
1 Introduction
Early work on language-based security, such as Volpano and Smith’s type systems [1], precluded
the use of high security variables to affect control flow. Specifically, the conditions in if-commands
and while-commands were restricted to using only low security information. If this restriction is
weakened, it opens up the possibility that high security data may be leaked through the different
timing behaviour of alternative control paths. This kind of leakage of information is said to form
a covert timing channel and is a serious threat to the security of programs (cf. e.g. [2]).
We develop a new notion of security against timing attacks where the attacker is able to
simultaneously observe the execution time of a (probabilistic) program and the probability of
the values of low variables. This notion is a non-trivial extension of similar ideas for deterministic
programs [3] which also covers attacks based on the combined observation of time and low variables.
This earlier work presents an approach which, having identified a covert timing channel, provides
a program transformation which neutralises the channel.
We start by introducing a semantic model of timed probabilistic transition systems. Our ap-
proach is based on modelling programs essentially as Markov Chains (MC) where the stochastic
behaviour is determined by a joint distribution on both the values assigned to the program’s
variables and the time it takes the program to perform a given command. This is very different
from other approaches in the area of automata theory which are also dealing with both time
and probability. In this area the timed automata constitute a well-established model [4]. These
automata have been extended with probability and used in model-checking for the verification
of probabilistic timed temporal logic properties of real-time systems [5]. The resulting model is
essentially a Markov Decision Process where rewards are interpreted as time durations and is
therefore quite different from our MC approach. In particular, the presence of non-determinism
makes it not very appropriate as a base of our quantitative analysis aiming at measuring timing
leaks. We next present a concrete programming language with a timed probabilistic transition sys-
tem as its execution model. This language is based on the language studied in [3] but is extended
with a probabilistic choice construct – whilst this may not play a role in user programs, it has an
essential role in our program transformation. In order to determine and quantify the security of
systems and the effectiveness of potential counter-measures against timing attacks we then discuss
an approximate notion of timed bisimilarity and construct an algorithm for computing a quanti-
tative estimate of the vulnerability of a system against timing attacks; this is given in terms of
the mismatch between the actual transition probabilities and those of an ideal perfectly confined
program. Finally, we present a probabilistic variation of Agat’s padding algorithm which we use
to illustrate – via an example – a technique for formally analysing the trade-off between security
costs and protection.
2 The Model
We introduce a general model for the semantics of programs where time and probability are explic-
itly introduced in order to keep track of both the probabilistic evolution of the program/system
state and its running time.
The scenario we have in mind is that of a multilevel security system and an attacker who can
observe the system looking at the values of its public variables and the time it takes to perform a
given operation or before terminating, or other similar properties related to its timing behaviour.
In order to keep the model simple, we assume that the time to execute a statement is constant
and that there is no distinction between any ‘local’ and ‘global’ clocks. In a more realistic model,
one has – of course – to take into account also that the execution speed might differ depending on
which other process is running on the same system and/or delays due to uncontrollable events in
the communication infrastructure, i.e. network.
Our reference model is the timed probabilistic transition system we define below. The intu-
itive idea is that of a probabilistic transition system (similar to those defined in all generality
in [6]) where transition probabilities are defined by a joint distribution of two random variables
representing the variable updates and time, respectively.
Let us consider a finite set X , and let Dist(X) denote the set of all probability distributions
on X , that is the set of all functions π : X → [0, 1], such that ∑x∈X π(x) = 1. We often represent
these functions as sets of tuples {〈x, π(x)〉}x∈X . If the set X is presented as a Cartesian product,
i.e. X = X1×X2, then we refer to a distribution on X also as a joint distribution on X1 and X2. A
joint distribution associates to each pair (x1, x2), with x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2 the probability π(x1, x2).
It is important to point out that, in general, it is not possible to define any joint distribution on
X1 × X2 as a ‘product’ of distributions on X1 and X2, i.e. for a given joint distribution π on
X = X1×X2 it is, in general, not possible to find distributions π1 and π2 on X1 and X2 such that
for all (x1, x2) ∈ X1 × X2 we have π(x1, x2) = π1(x1)π2(x2). In the special cases where a joint
distribution π can be expressed in this way, as a ‘product’, we say that the distributions π1 and
π2 are independent (cf. e.g. [7]).
2.1 Timed Probabilistic Transition Systems
The execution model of programs which we will use in the following is that of a labelled transition
system; more precisely, we will consider probabilistic transition systems (PTS). We will put labels
on transitions as well as states; the former will have “times” associated with them while the
latter will be labelled by uninterpreted entities which are intended to represent the values of (low
security) variables, i.e. the computational state during the execution of a program. We will not
specify what kind of “time labels” we use – e.g. whether we have a discrete or continuous time
model – we just assume that time labels are taken from a finite set T ⊆ R+ of positive real
numbers. The “state labels” will be taken from an abstract set which we denote by L.
Definition 1. We define a timed Probabilistic Transition System with labelled states, or tPTS,
as a triple (S,−→, λ), with S a finite set of states, −→ ⊆ S×T× [0, 1]×S a probabilistic transition
relation, and λ : S → L a state labelling function.
We denote by s1
p:t
// s2 the fact that (s1, p, t, s2) ∈−→ with s1, s2 ∈ S, p ∈ [0, 1] and t ∈ T.
In a general tPTS we can have non-determinism in the sense that for two states s1 s2 we may
have s1
1:t1 // s2 and s1
1:t2 // s2, which would suggest that it is possible to make a transition
from s1 to s2 in different times (t1 and t2) and probability 1, i.e. certainly. In order to eliminate
non-determinism we will consider in this paper only tPTS’s which are subject to the following
conditions:
1. for all s ∈ S we have ∑(s,pi,tj ,sk)∈−→ pi = 1, and
2. for all t ∈ T there is at most one tuple (s1, t, p, s2) ∈−→.
The first condition means that we consider here a purely probabilistic or generative execution
model. The second condition allows us to associate a unique probability to every transition time
between two states, i.e. triple (s1, t, s2); this means that we can define a function π : S ×T×S →
[0, 1] such that s1
p:t
// s2 iff π(s1, t, p2) = p. Note however, that it is still possible to have
differently timed transitions between states, i.e. it is possible to have (s1, t1, p2, s2) ∈−→ and
(s1, t2, p2, s2) ∈−→ with t1 6= t2.
If for all s1, s2 ∈ S there exists at most one (s1, t, p, s2) ∈−→, we can also represent a timed
Probabilistic Transition System with labelled states as a quadruple (S,−→, τ, λ) with τ : S×S →
[0, 1] × T, a timing function. Thus, to any two states s1 and s2 we associate a unique transition
time ts1,s2 and probability ps1,s2 .
Definition 2. Consider a tPTS (S,−→, λ) and an initial state s0 ∈ S. An execution sequence or
trace starting in s0 is a sequence (s0, s1, . . .) such that si
pi:ti // si+1, for all i = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
We associate, in the obvious way, to an execution sequence σ = (s0, s1, . . .) three more se-
quences: (i) the transition probability sequence: (p1, p2, . . .), (ii) a time stamp sequence: (t1, t2, . . .),
and (iii) a state label sequence: (λ(so), λ(s1), . . .).
Even for a tPTS with a finite number of states it is possible to have infinite execution se-
quences. It is thus, in general, necessary to consider measure theoretic notions in order to define
a mathematically sound model for the possible behaviours of a tPTS. However, as long as we
consider only terminating systems, i.e. finite traces, things are somewhat simpler. In particular,
in this case, probability distributions can replace measures as they are equivalent. In this paper
we restrict our attention to terminating traces and probability distributions. This allows us to
define for every finite execution sequence σ = (s0, s1, . . .) its running time as τ(σ) =
∑
ti, and its
execution probability as π(σ) =
∏
ti. We will also associate to every state s0 its execution tree, i.e.
the collection of all execution sequences starting in s0.
2.2 Observing tPTS’s
In Section 3 we will present an operational semantics of a simple imperative programming language,
pWhile, via a tPTS. Based on this model we will then investigate the vulnerability against attackers
who are able to observe (i) the time, and (ii) the state labels, i.e. the low variables. In this setting
we will argue that the combined observation of time and low variables is more powerful than the
observation of time and low variables separately. The following example aims to illustrate this
aspect which comes from the properties of joint probability distributions.
Example 1. In order to illustrate the role of joint distributions in the observation of timed PTS’s
let us consider the following simple systems.
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We assume that the attacker can observe the execution times and that he/she is also able to
(partially) distinguish (the final) states. In our example we assume that the states depicted as •
and ◦ form two classes which the attacker can identify (e.g. because • and ◦ states have the same
values for low, variables). The question now is whether this information allows the attacker to
distinguish the two tPTS’s.
If we consider the information obtained by observing the running time, we see that both
systems exhibit the same time behaviour corresponding to the distribution {〈1, 12 〉, {〈2, 12 〉} over
T = {1, 2}. The same is true in the case where the information is obtained by inspecting the final
states: we have the distributions {〈•, 12 〉, {〈◦, 12 〉} over L = {•, ◦} for both systems.
However, considering that the attacker can observe running time and labels simultaneously, we
see that the system on the right hand side always runs for 2 time steps iff it ends up in a • state
and 1 time step iff it ends up in a ◦ state. In the system on the left hand side there is no such
correlation between running time and final state. The difference between the two systems, which
allows an attacker to distinguish them, is reflected in the joint distributions over T×L. These can
be expressed in matrix form for the two systems above as:
χ1(t, l) 1 2
• 14 14
◦ 14 14
χ2(t, l) 1 2
• 0 12
◦ 12 0
Note that while χ1 is the product of two independent probability distributions on T and L it is
not possible to represent χ2 in the same way.
3 An Imperative Language
We consider a language similar to that used in [3] with the addition of a probabilistic choice
construct. The syntax of the language is as follows:
Operators: op ::= + | ∗ | − | = | ! = | < | <=
Expressions: e ::= v | x | e op e
Commands: C,D ::= x := e | skipAsn x e | if (e) then C else D | skipIf e C
| while (e) do C | C;D | choosep C or D
Basic Values: v ::= n | true | false
The probabilistic choice is used in an essential way in the program transformation presented later.
We also keep the language of types in [3], although in a simplified form:
Security levels s ::= L | H (with L ≤ H and s ≤ s)
Base types τ ::= Int | Bool
Security types τ ::= τ s
and sub-typing relation:
s1 ≤ s2
τ s1 ≤ τ s2
.
We will indicate by E the state of a computation and denote by EL its restriction to low
variables, i.e. a state which is defined as E for all the low variables for which E is defined, and
is undefined otherwise. We say that two configurations 〈E | C〉 and 〈E′ | C′〉 are low equivalent
if and only if EL = E
′
L and we indicate this by 〈E | C〉 =L 〈E′ | C′〉. In the following we will
sometimes use for configurations the shorthand notation c, c1, c2, . . . , c
′, c′1, . . .. We will also denote
by Conf the set of all configurations.
3.1 SOS Semantics
The operational semantics of pWhile – except for the probabilistic choice construct – follows
essentially the one presented in [3]. For the convenience of the reader we present here all the
rules which are based on the big step semantics for expressions (where [[op]] represents the usual
semantics of operators):
E ⊢ v ⇓ v E(x) = v
E ⊢ x ⇓ v
E ⊢ e1 ⇓ v1 E ⊢ e2 ⇓ v2
E ⊢ e1 op e2 ⇓ v1[[op]]v2
The small step semantics is then define as a timed PTS via the SOS rules in Table 1.
The time labels t. represent the time it takes to perform certain operations: tx is the time
to store a variable, te is the time it takes to evaluate an expression, tasn represents the time
(Assign) E ⊢ e ⇓ v
〈E | x := e〉
1:te·tx·tasn·
√
// E[x = v]
(Seq)
〈E | C〉
p:ts·√)
// E′
〈E | C;D〉
p:ts
// 〈E′ | D〉
〈E | C〉
p:ts
// 〈E′ | C′〉
〈E | C;D〉
p:ts
// 〈E′ | C′;D〉
(If)
E ⊢ e ⇓ true
〈E | if (e) then C else D〉
1:te·tbr // 〈E | C〉
E ⊢ e ⇓ false
〈E | if (e) then C else D〉
1:te·tbr // 〈E | D〉
(SkipAsn)
E ⊢ e ⇓ v
〈E | skipAsn x e〉
1:te·tasn·
√
// E
(SkipIf) E ⊢ e ⇓ v
〈E | skipIf e C〉
1:te·tbr // 〈E | C〉
v ∈ {true, false}
(While)
E ⊢ e ⇓ false
〈E | while (e) do C〉
1:te·tbr·
√
// E
E ⊢ e ⇓ true
〈E | while (e) do C〉
1:te·tbr // 〈E | C;while (e) do C〉
(Choose)
〈E | choosep C or D〉
p:tch // 〈E | C〉
〈E | choosep C or D〉
(1−p):tch // 〈E | D〉
Table 1. Operational Semantics
to perform an assignment, tbr is the time required for a branching step, and tch is the time to
perform a probabilistic choice. By ts we denote any sequence of time labels and with
√
we indicate
termination.
The rule (Choose) is the only new rule with respect to the original semantics in [3]. It states
that the execution of a probabilistic choice construct leads, after a time tch, to a state where either
the command C or the command D is executed with probability p or 1− p, respectively. This rule
together with the standard transition rules for the other constructs of the language define a tPTS
for our pWhile language according to Definition 1. In this tPTS, the state labels are given by the
environment, i.e. λ(〈E | C〉) = E.
3.2 Abstract Semantics
According to the notion of security we consider in this paper, an observer or attacker can only
observe the changes in low variables. Therefore, we can simplify the semantics by ‘collapsing’ the
execution tree in such a way that execution steps during which the value of all low variables is
unchanged are combined into one single step. We call an execution sequence σ deterministic if
π(σ) = 1, and we call it low stable if λ(si)|L = l for all si ∈ σ. The empty path (of length zero)
is by definition deterministic and low stable. An execution sequence is maximal deterministic/low
stable if it is not a proper sub-sequence of another deterministic/low stable path.
Definition 3. We define the collapsed transition relation by: 〈E1 | C1〉 p:T +3 〈E2 | C2〉 iff
(i) there exists a configuration 〈E′1 | C′1〉 such that 〈E1 | C1〉
p:t
// 〈E′1 | C′1〉,
(ii) the path 〈E′1 | C′1〉
1:t1 // . . .
1:tn−1
// 〈E′2 | C′2〉
1:tn // 〈E2 | C2〉 is deterministic,
(iii) the path 〈E1 | C1〉 p:t // 〈E′1 | C′1〉
1:t1 // . . .
1:tn−1
// 〈E′2 | C′2〉 is maximal low stable,
(iv) and T = t+
n∑
i=1
ti.
This is illustrated in the following example. In the depicted execution trees we indicate in the
nodes only the state and omit the program parts of the corresponding configurations. Moreover,
we use the notation [n,m] for the state E where h has value n and l has value m.
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The collapsed execution tree on the right hand side represents in effect what an attacker can
actually observe during the program execution (for our analysis of the situation we still record the
value of h although it is invisible to the attacker).
4 Bisimulation and Timing Leaks
Observing the low variables and the running time separately is not the same as observing them
together; a correlation between the two random variables (probability and time) has to be taken
into account (cf. Section 2). A naive probabilistic extension of the Γ -bisimulation notion introduced
in [3] might not take this into account. More precisely, this may happen if time and probability
are treated as two independent aspects which are observed separately in a mutual exclusive way.
According to such a notion an attacker must set up two different covert channels if she wants
to exploit possible interference through both the probabilistic and the timing behaviour of the
system.
The notion of bisimulation we introduce here allows us to define a stronger security condition:
an attacker must be able to distinguish the probabilities that two programs compute a given result
in a given execution time. This is obviously different from being able to distinguish the probability
distributions of the results and the running time.
4.1 Probabilistic Time Bisimulation
Probabilistic bisimulation was first introduced in [8] and refers to an equivalence on probability
distributions over the states of the processes. This latter equivalence is defined as a lifting of the
bisimulation relation on the support sets of the distributions, namely the states themselves.
An equivalence relation ∼ ⊆ S × S on S can be lifted to a relation ∼∗ ⊆ Dist(S) ×Dist(S)
between probability distributions on S via (cf [6, Thm 1]):
µ ∼∗ ν iff ∀[s] ∈ S/∼ : µ([s]) = ν([s]).
It follows that ∼∗ is also an equivalence relation ([6, Thm 3]).
For any equivalence relation ∼ on the set Conf of configurations, we define the associated low
equivalence relation ∼L by c1 ∼L c2 if c1 ∼ c2 and c1 =L c2. Obviously ∼L is again an equivalence
relation. We can lift a low equivalence ∼L to (∼L)∗ which we simply denote by ∼∗L.
Definition 4. Given a security typing Γ , a probabilistic time bisimilarity ∼ is the largest sym-
metric relation on configurations such that whenever c1 ∼ c2, then
c1 =⇒ χ1 implies that there exists χ2 such that c2 =⇒ χ2 and χ1 ∼∗L χ2.
We say that two configurations are probabilistic time bisimilar or PT-bisimilar, c1 ∼ c2, if
there exists a probabilistic time bisimilarity relation in which they are related.
This definition generalises the one in [3] which only applies to deterministic transition systems.
Note that there is a difference between ∼∗L= (∼L)∗ and (∼∗)L; in fact, only the former is able
to take into account the correlation between time and low variables, while the latter would be
a straightforward generalisation of the time bisimulation in [3] which is unable to model such a
correlation.
We now exploit the notion of bisimilarity introduced above in order to introduce a security
property ensuring that a system is confined against any combined attacks based on both timing
and probabilistic covert channels.
Definition 5. A pWhile program P is probabilistic time secure or PT-secure if for any set of
initial states E and E′ such that EL = E
′
L, we have 〈E,P 〉 ∼ 〈E′, P 〉.
5 Computing Approximate Bisimulation
The papers [9, 10] introduce an approximate version of bisimulation and confinement where the
approximation can be used as a measure ε for the information leakage of the system under analysis.
The quantity ε is formally defined in terms of the norm of a linear operator representing the
partition induced by the ‘minimal’ bisimulation on the set of the states of a given system, i.e. the
one minimising the observational difference between the system’s components. We show here how
to compute a non-trivial upper bound δ to ε by essentially exploiting the algorithmic solution
proposed by Paige and Tarjan [11] for computing bisimulation equivalence. This was already
adapted to PTS’s in [12], where it was used for constructing a padding algorithm as part of a
transformational approach to the timing leaks problem. In this approach the computational paths
of a program are transformed so as to make it perfectly secure by eliminating any possible timing
covert channel while preserving its I/O behaviour.
The algorithmwe present here is an instantiation of that algorithm where the abstract labels are
replaced by the statements in a concrete language (pWhile) and their execution times. Moreover,
instead of transforming the execution trees, our algorithm accumulates the information about the
difference between their transition probabilities and uses this information to compute an upper
bound δ to the maximal information leakage of the given program.
5.1 Computing δ for PT-Bisimulation
Algorithm 2 describes a procedure that can be used inside an algorithm for constructing a lumping
(i.e. a PT-bisimulation equivalence) of two tPTS’s T1 and T2. In particular, Algorithm 1 refers to
a such a procedure which follows the algorithmic paradigm for partition refinement introduced by
Paige and Tarjan in [11] (see also [13, 14]). The Paige-Tarjan algorithm constructs a partition of
a state space Σ which is stable for a given transition relation →. It is a well-known result that
this partition corresponds to a bisimulation equivalence on the transition system (Σ,→). The
refinement procedure used in the algorithm consists in splitting the blocks in a given partition P
by replacing each block B ∈ P with B ∩ preS and B \ preS, where S ⊆ Σ and pre(X) = {s ∈ Σ |
s→ x for some x ∈ X}.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for detecting critical blocks
1: procedure QLumping(T1, T2)
2: Assume: T1 execution tree with states S1, and T2 execution tree with states S2
3: δ ← 0
4: n← 0
5: P ← {S1 ∪ S2} ⊲ (Initial) Partition
6: while n ≤ Height(T1 ⊕ T2) do
7: S ← {B ∩CutOff(T1 ⊕ T2, n)) | B ∈ P} ⊲ Splitters (below)
8: while S 6= ∅ do
9: choose B ∈ S, S ← S \ B ⊲ Choose a splitter
10: P ← Splitting(B,P ) ⊲ Split partition
11: end while
12: L1 ← Layer(T1, n), L2 ← Layer(T2, n)
13: CompDelta(L1, L2)
14: n← n+ 1 ⊲ Go to next level
15: end while
16: return δ
17: end procedure
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for computing δ
1: procedure CompDelta(L1, L2)
2: while L1 6= ∅ do
3: choose s1 ∈ L1, L1 ← L1 \ s1 ⊲ For all s1 ∈ L1
4: β ←∞
5: L← L2
6: while L2 6= ∅ do
7: choose s2 ∈ L, L← L \ s2 ⊲ For all s2 ∈ L2
8: β ← min(β, ‖χ(s1)− χ(s2)‖∞) ⊲ Find best match
9: end while
10: δ ← max(δ, β)
11: end while
12: end procedure
In order to check whether two execution trees T1 and T2 in our tPTS model are PT-bisimilar,
in Algorithm 1 we apply this refinement technique to the set of states formed by the disjoint union
of the states in T1 and T2. The strategy of our lumping procedure QLumping(T1, T2) is as follows:
it proceeds iteratively layer by layer starting from the leaves layer, and splits the blocks in the
current partition restricted to the current layer. The procedure CompDelta(L1, L2) computes
for each two layers L1 and L2, the maximal difference ‖χ(s1)−χ(s2)‖∞ between the probabilities
to get from states in T1 ∩ L1 and T2 ∩ L1, respectively, into states of layer L2. In the original
lumping procedure this would determine a splitting of the states in layer L1. This value is stored
in a variable β and compared with the current value of a variable δ which contains the maximal
difference up to that iteration. When the lumping algorithm terminates (that is when we have
reached the root of the union tree), one of the following situations will occur: either the roots of
T1 and T2 belong to the same class in the constructed partition (i.e. T1 and T2 are PT-bisimilar)
or not. In the latter case δ will contain a maximal difference in the transition probabilities of the
two processes which makes them non-bisimilar. This is therefore an estimate of the information
leakage of the system. Note that, by construction, δ will be zero in the first case.
The strategy for constructing the lumping described above determines the coarsest partition of
a set which is stable wrt a given relation [13, 14], that is in our case the coarsest PT-bisimulation
equivalence. Obviously, this does not necessarily coincide with the ‘minimal’ one corresponding to
the quantity ε defined in [9]. Thus, δ will be in general only a safe approximation, namely an upper
bound to the capacity of probabilistic timing covert channel defined by ε. The following proposition
is therefore a corollary of Proposition 45 in [9] stating a similar assertion for ε-bisimulation.
Proposition 1. P is PT-secure iff for any pair of initial configurations c1, c2 the corresponding
execution trees T1 and T2 are such that QLumping(T1, T2) returns δ = 0.
5.2 A Weighted Version: δ′
The actual value of δ is determined by the way we compute the best match between the joint
probability distributions χ(s1) and χ(s2) in line 8 of CompDelta(L1, L2). In order to compute δ
we use the supremum norm, ‖ · ‖∞, between two distributions, i.e. the largest absolute difference
between corresponding entries in χ(s1) and χ(s2), respectively. In other words, we try to identify
a class of states C (in the layer below) and a time interval t such that the probability of reaching
this class in that time from s1 differs maximally from the one for s2.
One can argue that this is a fair approach as we treat all classes and time labels the same way.
However, it might be useful to develop a measure which reflects the fact that certain times and
classes are more similar than others.
From the point of view of the attacker, such a measure would encode her/his ability in detecting
similarity as given by the nature and the precision of the instruments he is actually using. For
example, suppose it is possible to reach the same class C from s1 and s2 with different times t1
and t2, such that the corresponding probabilities determine δ (i.e. we have the maximal difference
in this case). However, we might in certain circumstances also want to express the fact that t1
and t2 are more or less similar, e.g. for t1 = 10 and t2 = 10.5 we might want a smaller δ
′ than for
t1 = 1 and t2 = 100. In terms of the attacker, this means that we make our estimate dependent
on the actual power of the time detection instrument that he/she possesses.
In order to incorporate similarity of times and/or classes we need to modify the way we
determine the best match in line 8 of CompDelta(L1, L2). Instead of determining the norm
between χ(s1) and χ(s2) we can compute a weighted version as:
β ← min(β, ‖ω · χ(s1)− ω · χ(s2)‖∞) = min(β, ‖ω · (χ(s1)− χ · (s2))‖∞),
where ω re-scales the entries in χ(s1) and χ(s2) so as to reflect the relative importance of certain
times and/or classes. Note that “·” denotes here the component-wise and not the matrix multipli-
cation: (ω ·χ)tC = ωtCχtC . If, for example, an attacker is not able to detect the absolute difference
between times but can only measure multiplicities expressing approximative proportions, we could
re-scale the χ’s via ωtC = log(t).
In the following we will use a weighted version δ′ which reflects the similarity of classes. The
idea is to weight according to the “replaceability” of a class. To this purpose we associate to every
class (in the layers below) a matching measure µ(C) = minC 6=C′ δ
′(C,C′), i.e. we determine the
δ′ between a (sub)tree with a root in the class C in question and all (sub)trees with roots in any
of the other classes C′. We can take any representative of the classes C and C′ as these are by
definition bisimilar. The measure µ indicates how easy it is to replace class C by another one, or
how good/precise is the attacker in distinguishing successor states. Then δ′ is simply the weighted
version of δ as described above with ωtC = µ(C). Note that there is no problem with the fact that
δ′ is defined recursively as we always know the δ′ in the layers below before we compute δ′ in the
current layer.
Example 2. In order to illustrate how δ and δ′ quantify the difference between various execution
trees, let us consider the following four trees.
•1
1
•2
1 •3
1 •3
•11
2
||xx
xx
1
2
""F
FF
F
•2
1 
•3
1 •4 •5
1 •6
•1
1
•21
2
||xx
xx
1
2
""F
FF
F
•3 •4
1 •5
•1
1
•2
1 •31
2
||xx
xx
1
2
""F
FF
F
•4 •5
We abstract from the influence of different transition times and individual state labels, i.e. we
assume that t = 1 for all transitions and that all states are labelled with the same label.
If we compute the δ and δ′ values between all the pairs of systems we get the following results:
δ T1 T2 T3 T4
T1 0.000 0.500 1.000 0.000
T2 0.500 0.000 1.000 0.500
T3 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
T4 0.000 0.500 1.000 0.000
δ′ T1 T2 T3 T4
T1 0.000 0.250 0.125 0.000
T2 0.250 0.000 0.125 0.250
T3 0.125 0.125 0.000 0.125
T4 0.000 0.250 0.125 0.000
From this we see that δ and δ′ are symmetric, i.e. the difference between two systems is symmetric;
that every system is bisimilar with itself, i.e. δ = 0 = δ′ (as we have an empty diagonal); and
that the difference between two systems is between zero and one with values in between very well
possible.
6 Cost Analysis
In a recent article on “Software Bugtraps” in The Economist the authors report on some ongoing
research at NIST on “Software Assurance Metrics and Tool Evaluation” [15]. They claim that
“The purpose of the research is to get away from the feeling that ‘all software has bugs’ and say ‘it
will cost this much money to make software of this kind of quality’”. They then conclude: “Rather
than trying to stamp out bugs altogether, in short, the future of ”software that makes software
better” may lie in working out where the pesticide can be most cost-effectively applied”.
Our aim is to introduce “cost factors” in a similar way into computer security. Instead of trying
to achieve perfect security we will look at the trade-off between costs of security counter measures
– such as increased average running time – and the improvement in terms of security, which we can
measure via the δ introduced above. Even in simple examples we are able to exhibit interesting
effects.
6.1 Security Typing
In [3] Agat introduces a program transformation to remove covert timing channels (timing leaks)
from programs written in a sequential imperative programming language. The language used is
a language of security types with two security levels that is based on earlier work by Volpano
and Smith [16, 1]. Whilst Volpano and Smith restrict the condition in both while-loops and if-
commands to being of the lowest security level, Agat allows the condition in an if-command to be
high security providing that an external observer cannot detect which branch was taken. He shows
that if a program is typeable in his system, then it is secure against timing attacks. This result
depends critically on a notion of bisimulation; an if-command with a high security condition is
only typeable if the two branches are bisimilar. Agat’s notion of bisimilarity is timing aware and
based on a notion of low-equivalence which ensures stepwise non-interference. He does not give an
algorithm for bisimulation checking.
If a program fails to type, Agat presents a transformation system to remove the timing leak.
The transformation pads the branches of if-commands with high security conditions with dummy
commands. The objective of the padding is that both branches end up with the same timing and
thus become indistinguishable by an external observer. The transformation utilises the concept
of a low-slice: for a given command C, its low-slice CL has the same syntactic structure as C
but only has assignments to low security variables; all assignments to high security variables and
branching on high security conditions are replaced by skip commands of appropriate duration.
The transformation involves extending the branches in a high security if-command by adding
the low-slice from the other branch. The effect of this transformation is that the timing of the
execution of both branches are the same and equal to the sum of timing of the two branches in the
untransformed program. Agat demonstrates that the transformation is semantically sound and
that transformed programs are secure (correctness).
(AssignH)
Γ ⊢≤ e : τs Γ ⊢= x : τH s ≤ H
Γ ⊢ x := e : skipAsn x e
(AssignL)
Γ ⊢≤ e : τL Γ ⊢= x : τL
Γ ⊢ x := e : x := e
(Seq) Γ ⊢ C : CL Γ ⊢ D : DL
ΓC;D : CL;DL
(IfH)
Γ ⊢≤ e : BoolH Γ ⊢ C : CL Γ ⊢ D : DL
Γ ⊢ if (e) then C else D : skipIf e CL
CL ∼ DL
(IfL)
Γ ⊢≤ e : BoolL Γ ⊢ C : CL Γ ⊢ D : DL
Γ ⊢ if (e) then C else D : if (e) then CL else DL
(While)
Γ ⊢≤ e : BoolL Γ ⊢ C : CL
Γ ⊢ while (e) do C : while (e) do CL
(Choose) Γ ⊢ C : CL Γ ⊢ D : DL
Γ ⊢ choosep C or D : choosep CL or DL
(SkipAsn)
Γ ⊢ skipAsn x e : skipAsn x e
(SkipIf) Γ ⊢ C : CL
Γ ⊢ skipIf e C : skipIf e CL
Table 2. Security Typing Rules
In order to extend this system to our language, we only have to add a rule for the choose
statement (essentially a straight forward extension of the rule for if). In detail, we present the
typing rules in Table 2. Note that the rule (IfH) refers to the semantic notion of timed bisimilarity
(as introduced in Section 4.1).
6.2 Probabilistic Transformation
We consider a probabilistic variant of Agat’s language. Probabilities play an important role in the
transformation. Rather than just adding the low slice from the other branch to each branch of
a high security conditional, we transform each branch to make a probabilistic choice between its
padded and untransformed variant. This allows us to trade-off the increased run-time of the padded
program versus the vulnerability to attack of the untransformed program. The transformation
described is just one on a whole spectrum of probabilistic transformations – at the other extreme
we could probabilistically decide whether or not to execute each command in the low slice. All the
formal transformation rules for probabilistic padding are the same as in [3]. The only exception is
the rule (IfH): Here we replace – provided certain typing conditions are fulfilled – the branches of
an if statement not just by the correctly “padded” version as in [3]; instead we introduce in every
branch a choice such that the secure replacement will be executed only with probability p while
with probability 1− p the original code fragment will be executed.
In order to transform programs into secure versions we need to introduce an auxiliary notion,
namely the notion of global effect ge(C) of commands. This is used to identify (global) variables
(AssignH )
Γ ⊢≤ e : τs Γ ⊢= x : τH s ≤ H
Γ ⊢ x := e →֒ x := e | skipAsn x e
(AssignL)
Γ ⊢≤ e : τL Γ ⊢= x : τL
Γ ⊢ x := e →֒ x := e | x := e
(Seq)
Γ ⊢ C1 →֒ D1 | D1L Γ ⊢ C2 →֒ D2 | D2L
Γ ⊢ C1;C2 →֒ D1;D2 | D1L;D2L
(IfH)
Γ ⊢≤ e : BoolH Γ ⊢ C1 →֒ D1 | D1L Γ ⊢ C2 →֒ D2 | D2L ge(D1L) = ∅ ge(D2L) = ∅
Γ ⊢ if (e) then C1 else C2 →֒
if (e) then (choosep D1 or D1;D2L) else
(choosep D2 or D1L;D2) | skipIf e (D1L;D2L)
(IfL)
Γ ⊢≤ e : BoolL Γ ⊢ C1 →֒ D1 | D1L Γ ⊢ C2 →֒ D2 | D2L
Γ ⊢ if (e) then C1 else C2 →֒ if (e) then D1 else D2 | if (e) then D1L else D2L
(While)
Γ ⊢≤ e : BoolL Γ ⊢ C →֒ D | DL
Γ ⊢ while (e) do C →֒ while (e) do D | while (e) do DL
(Choose)
Γ ⊢ C1 →֒ D1 | D1L Γ ⊢ C2 →֒ D2 | D2L
Γ ⊢ choosep C1 or C2 →֒ choose
p
D1 or D2 | choose
p
D1L or D2L
(SkipAsn)
Γ ⊢ skipAsn x e →֒ skipAsn x e | skipAsn x e
(SkipIf)
Γ ⊢ C →֒ D | DL
Γ ⊢ skipIf e C →֒ skipIf e D | skipIf e DL
Table 3. Probabilistic Program Transformation
which might be changed when a command C is executed. Here is its formal definition:
ge(x := e) = {x}
ge(C1;C2) = ge(C1) ∪ ge(C2)
ge(if (e) then C1 else C2) = ge(C1) ∪ ge(C2)
ge(while (e) do C) = ge(C)
ge(choosep C1 or C2) = ge(C1) ∪ ge(C2)
ge(skipAsn x e) = ∅
ge(skipIf e C) = ge(C).
The judgments or transformation rules in Table 3 are of the general form:
Γ ⊢ C →֒ D | DL
which represents the fact that with a certain (security) typing Γ we can transform the statement
C into D – we also recorder as a side-product the so-called low slice DL of D.
6.3 An Example
Our probabilistic version of Agat’s padding algorithm allows us to obtain partially fixed programs.
Depending on the parameter p with which we introduce empty low slices to obfuscate the timing
leaks we can determine the (average) execution time of the fixed program in comparison with the
improvement in security.
Agat presents in his paper [3] an example which itself is based on Kocher’s study [2] of timing
attacks against the RSA algorithm. In order to illustrate our approach we simplify the example
i := 1;
while i<=3 do
if k[i]==1 then
s := s;
else
skip;
fi;
i := i+1;
od;
i := 1;
while i<=3 do
if k[i]==1 then
choose p: s := s; skip
or q: s := s
ro
else
choose p: skip
or q: s := s; skip
ro
fi;
i := i+1;
od;
i := 1;
while i<=3 do
if k[i]==1 then
s := s; skip
else
s := s; skip
fi;
i := i+1;
od;
Table 4. Versions of Agat’s Program: agat,pagat, and fagat
slightly: The insecure program agat we start with is depicted on the left side in Table 4. The
fully padded version Agat’s algorithm produces, fagat, is on the right hand side of Table 4 (to
keep things simple we omit Agat’s empty statements like skipAsn s s; as skip as well as s:=s
can be used just to ‘spend time’ without having any real effect on the store we can use e.g.
s:=s in place of Agat’s skipAsn s s). The program, pagat, presented in the middle of Table 4
is the result of probabilistic padding: The original program agat is transformed in such a way
that the compensating statements, i.e. low slices, are executed only with probability p while with
probability q = 1 − p the original code is executed. For p = 0 we have the same behaviour as
the original program agat while for p = 1 this program behaves in the same way as Agat’s fully
padded version fagat.
In our concrete experiments we used the following assumptions. The variable i can take values
in {1, .., 4} while k is a three dimensional array with values in {0, 1} – nothing is concretely
assumed about s. The variables k, representing a secret key, and s have security typing H , while
i is the only low variable which can be observed by an attacker. We implemented this example
using (arbitrary) execution times: tasn = 3 (assign time), tbr = 2 (test/branch time), and tskip = 1
(skip time), and tch = 0 (choice time).
The abstract semantics for the pagat program – which only records choice points and the
moments in time when the low variable changes its value – produces the following execution trees
if we start with keys k=011 and k=010:
•
1:5
+3 •
q:4
%-
p:7
19 •
1:2
+3 •
q:6
%-
p:7
19 •
1:2
+3 •
q:6
%-
p:7
19 •
1:1
+3 •
•
1:5
+3 •
q:4
%-
p:7
19 •
1:2
+3 •
q:6
%-
p:7
19 •
1:2
+3 •
q:4
%-
p:7
19 •
1:1
+3 •
One can easily see from this how probabilistic padding influences the behaviour of a program: For
every bit in the key k – i.e. every iteration – we have a choice between executing the original code
with probability q = 1 − p or the ‘safe’ code with probability p. The new code always takes the
same time (in our case 7 ticks) while the original code’s execution time depends on whether k[i]
is set or not (either 4 or 6 time steps in our case). Clearly, for p = 0 we get in every iteration
a different execution time, depending on the bit k[i], and thus can deduce the secrete value k
by just observing the execution times. However, as the execution time is always the same for the
replacement code, it is impossible to do the same for p = 1. For values of p between 0 and 1, the
(average) execution times for k[i] = 0 and k[i] = 1 become more and more similar. This means
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Fig. 1. Running Time t(p) and Security Level δ′(p) as Functions of p
in practical terms that the attacker has to spend more and more time (i.e. repeated observations
of the program) in order to determine with high confidence the exact execution time and thus
deduce the value of k[i] (cf. e.g. [9]).
The price we have to pay for increased security, i.e. indistinguishability of behaviours, is an
increased (average) execution time. The graph on the left in Figure 1 shows how the running
time (vertical axis) increases in dependence of the padding probability p (horizontal axis) for the
eight execution trees we have to consider in this example, i.e. for k = 000, k = 001, k = 010, etc.
Depending on the number of bits set in k we get four different curves which show how, for example
for k = 000 the running time increases from 29 time steps (for p = 0, i.e. agat program) to 38 (for
p = 1, i.e. fagat program).
We can employ the bisimilarity measures δ and δ′ in order to determine the security of the
partially padded program. For this we compute using our algorithm δ(ki, kj) and δ
′(ki, kj) for all
possible keys, i.e. i, j = 0, . . . 7. It turns out that δ = 1 for all values of p < 1 and any pair of
keys ki and kj with i 6= i; only for p = 1 we get, as one would expect, δ = 0 for all key pairs.
The weighted measure δ′ is more sensitive and we get for example for p = 0.5 the following values
when we compare ki and kj:
δ′ 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
000 0.000 0.125 0.250 0.125 0.500 0.125 0.250 0.125
001 0.125 0.000 0.125 0.250 0.125 0.500 0.125 0.250
010 0.250 0.125 0.000 0.125 0.250 0.125 0.500 0.125
011 0.125 0.250 0.125 0.000 0.125 0.250 0.125 0.500
100 0.500 0.125 0.250 0.125 0.000 0.125 0.250 0.125
101 0.125 0.500 0.125 0.250 0.125 0.000 0.125 0.250
110 0.250 0.125 0.500 0.125 0.250 0.125 0.000 0.125
111 0.125 0.250 0.125 0.500 0.125 0.250 0.125 0.000
The diagonal entries are, of course, all zero as every execution tree is bisimilar to itself. The other
entries however are different from 0 and 1 and reflect the similarity between the two keys and thus
the resulting execution trees. If we plot the development of δ′ as a function of p we observe only
three patterns as depicted in the right graph in Figure 1. In all three cases δ′ decreases from an
original value 1 to 0, but in different ways.
In analysing the trade-off between increased running time and security we need to define a cost
function. For example, one could be faced with a situation where a certain code fragment needs to
be executed in a certain maximal time, i.e. there is a (cost) penalty if the execution takes longer
than a certain number of micro-seconds. In our case we will consider a very simple cost function
c(p) = 6δ′(p) + t(p) with δ′(p) and t(p) the average δ′ between all possible execution trees and t
0 110
2
10
3
10
4
10
5
10
6
10
7
10
8
10
9
10 1
t(p)
δ′(p)
c(p)
Fig. 2. Trade-Off and Costs c(p) as a Functions of p
the average running time. The diagram in Figure 2 depicts how c(p), δ′(p) and t(p) depend on the
padding parameter p.
One can argue about the practical relevance of the particular cost function we chose. Never-
theless, this example illustrates already nicely the non-linear nature of security cost optimisation:
The optimal, i.e. minimal, cost is reached in this case for p = 0.5, i.e. keeping the cost of security
counter measures in mind it is better to use a “half-fixed” program rather than a completely safe
one.
7 Related and Further Work
The idea of defining a secure system via the requirement that an attacker must be unable to
observe different behaviours as a result of different secrets – i.e. the system “operates in the same
way” whatever value a secret key has – goes back at least to the seminal work of Goguen and
Meseguer [17].
This led in a number of settings to formalisations of security concepts such as “non-interference”
via various notions of behavioural equivalencies (see e.g. [18, 19]). One of the perhaps most promi-
nent of these equivalence notions, namely bisimilarity, plays an important role in the context of
security of concurrent systems but also found application for sequential programs such as in Agat’s
work (as the interaction between system and attacker can be modelled as a parallel composition).
In order to allow for a decision theoretic analysis of security counter-measures and associated ef-
forts it appears to be desirable to introduce a “quantitative” notion of the underlying behavioural
equivalence. In the case of bisimilarity a first step was the introduction of the notion of proba-
bilistic bisimulation by Larson and Skou [8]. However, this notion turns out to be still too strict
and a number of researchers developed “approximate” versions; among them we just name the
approaches by Desharnais et.al. [20, 21] and van Breugel [22] and our work [10, 24] (an extensive
bibliography on this issue can be found in [23]). We based this current paper on the latter ap-
proach because it allows for an implementation of the semantics of pWhile via linear operators,
i.e. matrices, and an efficient computation of δ and δ′ using standard software such as octave [25].
Further research will be needed in order to clarify the relation between our measures δ and
existing notions of approximate bisimilarity mentioned above, e.g. the ε in [9]. Furthermore, we
also would like to shed more light on the relationship between our notion and information theoretic
concepts used in the work of, for example Clark et.al. [26] and Boreale [27].
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